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Humans frequently perform extravagant and seemingly costly behaviors, such as widely sharing 47 
hunted resources, erecting conspicuous monumental structures, and performing dramatic acts of 48 
religious devotion. Evolutionary anthropologists and archaeologists have used signaling theory 49 
to explain the function of such displays1–4, drawing inspiration from behavioral ecology3–5, 50 
economics,6 and the social sciences7,8. While signaling theory is broadly aimed at explaining 51 
honest communication, it has come to be strongly associated with the handicap principle9, which 52 
proposes that such costly extravagance is in fact an adaptation for signal reliability3–5. Most 53 
empirical studies of signaling theory have focused on obviously costly acts, and consequently 54 
anthropologists have likely overlooked a wide range of signals that also promote reliable 55 
communication10. Here, we aim to build on recent developments in signaling theory and animal 56 
communication, developing an updated framework that highlights the diversity of signal 57 
contents, costs, contexts, and reliability mechanisms present within human signaling systems. By 58 
broadening the perspective of signaling theory in human systems, we strive to identify promising 59 
areas for further empirical and theoretical work.  60 
 61 
INTRODUCTION 62 
 63 
How do individuals manage to communicate honestly with one another when there is so often 64 
the temptation to deceive others for personal gain? Signaling theory delineates the conditions 65 
under which honest communication can evolve (in more technical terms, when a receiver can 66 
have confidence in the reliability of a signal; see Box 1 for more detail on these conditions). One 67 
well-studied mechanism for maintaining honest communication is costly signaling3–6, in which 68 
the costs of dishonest signaling are high enough that only honest signaling will be favored by 69 
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selection. For example, if successfully hunting hard-to-catch prey requires skill from the 70 
hunter—as well as time and energy investments—then regularly acquiring and sharing such prey 71 
could reliably indicate that hunter’s expertise11. Similarly, if holding a feast entails cajoling and 72 
coordinating many contributors, then successfully doing so could provide evidence of the host’s 73 
social support and status12. Often, the costs involved in such displays would otherwise remain 74 
unexplained by standard evolutionary models, with the costs appearing to be wasteful 75 
expenditures. Signaling theory has therefore been widely adopted in the evolutionary sciences as 76 
a possible explanation for many behaviors that appear to impose a net cost on performers.  77 
 78 
Within evolutionary anthropology, early applications of signaling theory extended narrow 79 
ecological models of decision-making to include the pursuit of symbolic and culturally specific 80 
measures of status10,13. For example, anthropologists found evidence suggesting that signal 81 
senders convey information about their strength11, skill14, prosociality15,16, commitments17–19, and 82 
social status2,20, with one signal potentially conveying information about multiple attributes 83 
simultaneously. In this work, signaling theory has largely been used to explain three broad types 84 
of behavior: i) the pursuit of risky resources, especially when the resources are widely 85 
shared11,12,14,21–23 (Box 2A); ii) contribution to a public good, as with blood donation24,25 (Box 86 
2B); iii) religious behaviors that entail sizable investments of time, money, and energy in the 87 
name of the divine17,19,26–30 (Box 2C). Empirical investigations have suggested that signals result 88 
in improved status and reputational standing27, leading to increased social support and well-89 
being16,19,23,29,31, and ultimately reproductive success32–34.  90 
 91 
Behavioral ecologists have continued to develop and refine signaling theory since its initial 92 
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introduction to anthropology in the late 1990s. While models of signaling theory in behavioral 93 
ecology initially focused on a single signal and pairwise interaction between sender and receiver, 94 
more recent work on animal communication has called attention to the complex reality of 95 
signaling systems, with the potential for multiple signal components and multiple interacting 96 
individuals35–41. Here we review the foundations of signaling theory and synthesize these recent 97 
developments, discussing their relevance to human signaling systems. While acknowledging the 98 
empirical challenges, we offer a framework that is intended to guide studies of human signals in 99 
all their diversity and complexity. In so doing, we build on earlier efforts to bring some of the 100 
insights from behavioral ecology to anthropology11,13,21,42, emphasizing the avenues for future 101 
research that are consequently opened. 102 
 103 
SIGNALING FRAMEWORK 104 
 105 
Applications of signaling theory to human signals often start by noting an obviously costly 106 
behavior, hypothesizing that it may hold some signal value, and evaluating that hypothesis by 107 
assessing whether costly senders are honestly signaling high quality (e.g., whether putative 108 
signals of generosity are being given by individuals who are “actually” more generous). This 109 
“costs-first” approach contrasts with how signals are typically studied in behavioral ecology, 110 
which can be thought of as a “content-first” approach. Researchers start by identifying a putative 111 
signal and then construct hypotheses about what factors have shaped it, e.g. what are the benefits 112 
of signaling versus not signaling43 or what (if any) costs signaling may entail. 113 
 114 
Content, cost and context in signaling systems  6 
 
Consider a female sedge warbler hearing the song of a male44. In this example the male is the 115 
sender, who produces a signal (the song). The signal is then transmitted through the environment 116 
to a receiver (the female), prompting a possible response45. The signal is part of a system that 117 
includes multiple signalers (e.g., competing males), multiple signals (e.g., elaborate displays 118 
combining flight with song), and multiple receivers (e.g., females and predators who use the 119 
song as a cue to locate prey), operating within a particular socioecological context. 120 
Understanding how a particular signal functions requires attention to all these elements. 121 
 122 
To investigate the function of a signal, we start by asking why senders send signals in the first 123 
place, and why receivers respond. Senders benefit by shaping the actions of others to serve their 124 
own interests (for example, the male warbler attracting the female to mate with him) and 125 
receivers benefit by responding to the signal in an appropriate way (the female chooses the most 126 
desirable mate). Thus, signals are behaviors or structures that have evolved (whether through 127 
natural or cultural selection) in order to generate a response that on average benefits both senders 128 
and receivers9,38,45–49. 129 
 130 
Signals function to change the behavior of the receiver, but it is not as straightforward as simply 131 
communicating one’s desired outcomes. This is because the interests of sender and receiver can 132 
diverge, and thus receivers benefit by being skeptical of the senders’ intentions. However, there 133 
are a number of mechanisms, discussed in Box 1, which can maintain signal reliability, and so 134 
overcome such skepticism. In the case of the sedge warbler, the ability of a male to produce a 135 
difficult song is related to his health, so females benefit by mating with a male who produces a 136 
complex song50.  137 
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 138 
Human signals are often more complicated than the song of a male warbler, yet they are also the 139 
product of selection and thus can be profitably analyzed using behavioral ecological methods. In 140 
order to facilitate such an approach, we present a framework structured along three sources of 141 
variation in signals: content, cost, and context. First, we categorize signal content (Figure 1): the 142 
attributes of the sender that are encoded in a signal. Second, we categorize the cost structure of 143 
signals, with an emphasis on how costs can promote signal reliability (Figure 2). Third, we 144 
consider the context in which signaling interactions occur, highlighting the socioecological 145 
factors that may influence the form or forms that signals take. By calling attention to these 146 
aspects of signaling systems, we are suggesting a different orientation for researchers that 147 
focuses on the full systemic process of communication and interaction rather than simply the 148 
production costs of a potential signal. We illustrate our approach with three case studies (Box 2).  149 
 150 
Signal content 151 
 152 
What is it that might comprise signal content? What is, for example, the signal content of the 153 
male sedge warbler’s song? Turning to humans, what of a Tlingit chief carrying out a potlatch, a 154 
Tamil devotee participating in the monthly worship at the temple, or a Hadza forager sharing 155 
collected honey (Box 2)? By signal content, we refer to the attributes of the sender or the 156 
environment that the receiver(s) assess from the signal. Content is typically considered as an 157 
advertisement of the sender’s “quality”5,6, which can denote a range of attributes including 158 
wealth, skills, status, and social commitments, or reveals information about the environment, 159 
such as the location of food or predators. However, it is important to realize that it is the 160 
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receivers who are responsible for interpreting the signal and acting upon it. Receivers vary in 161 
their needs and interests, and hence also in their responses to signals. We thus ground signal 162 
content in the strategic value of its outcome to the sender and receiver. While signals about the 163 
environment are common, they are also often more easily assessed by receivers, so we 164 
consequently focus our attention on signals about sender quality. Specifically, we see the content 165 
of such signals as generally relating to i) the sender’s capital (e.g., her wealth or fighting ability) 166 
and/or ii) the sender’s character in terms of her values and commitments (e.g., her commitment 167 
to reproductive fidelity or her willingness to give) (Figure 1). 168 
 169 
Senders’ attributes 170 
 171 
The sender’s capital comprises sources or supplies of resources that confer adaptive benefits to 172 
those with access. Drawing on previous literature, we delineate three forms of capital: material, 173 
embodied, and social7,51. Material capital is the tangible and alienable resources often associated 174 
with economic wealth, including land, money, food, and property. Embodied capital refers to the 175 
sender’s physiological and noetic attributes, such as her immune function, physical strength, 176 
skill, or intelligence51,52. Social capital stems from the sender’s location in a social network, her 177 
interpersonal relationships, and the resources that can be gained through social contacts7. The 178 
sender’s character represents the subjective values and commitments of the sender, which derive 179 
from the sender’s mental representations and perspectives of the world. These include 180 
dispositions, emotional states, and moral values, which can typify a sender and inform the 181 
receiver about the sender’s expected behavior. Hence, character refers to expectations of future 182 
states and actions, and so can only be verified with time. For instance, the attribute of 183 
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reproductive fidelity can only be verified so long as the sender continues to remain faithful. Any 184 
given putative signal may contain one or more aspects of signal content, and this may be 185 
especially true for human signals. While the male sedge warbler’s song is indicative of what we 186 
term here embodied capital (healthy males have more complex songs50), the act of attending a 187 
puja (Hindu worship) by Tamil devotees may demonstrate their material capital through the 188 
commitment of time and offerings, as well as their character27 (Figure 1). 189 
 190 
Receivers’ interpretations and responses 191 
 192 
Receivers can vary in how they respond to the same signal, meaning that signals can be 193 
“pluripotent”41. For instance, the male sedge warbler’s song is not only heard by females, but 194 
also by other males who may interpret the song as a territorial intrusion. In humans, yet again the 195 
situation can be more complex: for example, extravagant gift-giving could be interpreted as an 196 
indicator of generosity (sender’s character) or wealth (sender’s capital). This potential 197 
multiplicity of meanings does not imply that the signal will not have a reliable probabilistic 198 
effect on receiver behavior; it simply implies that the effect will be different for different classes 199 
of receiver (e.g. males versus females, in-group versus out-group)41.  200 
 201 
Signal costs 202 
 203 
Why should the female sedge warbler pay attention to the male’s song? In order to make any 204 
inferences, a receiver must have some confidence in the reliability of the signal, that is, the 205 
degree to which the signal is correlated with the sender’s underlying character and/or capital. 206 
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There are multiple ways in which signals may be kept reliable38,47,53, which we discuss further in 207 
Box 1. Here, however, we focus on signal costs, because they have received considerable 208 
attention in the anthropological literature and have also been a source of misunderstanding9.  209 
 210 
Models of costly signaling have shown that signal costs function to maintain reliability when 211 
signaling at the same level is more costly to a lower quality individual than it is to a higher 212 
quality individual3–6. Strictly, what is important are the differential marginal costs: for example, 213 
the marginal cost of donating $100 to charity would be extremely high for a donor with little 214 
material capital, but relatively low for a rich philanthropist. As anthropologists applying 215 
signaling theory have long recognized, these costs can be paid in many different currencies (e.g., 216 
calories, time, money), which we again categorize in terms of capital. As an individual’s capital 217 
determines her productive capacity, delineating costs in terms of capital explicitly draws the 218 
connection between the costs associated with a signal and its ultimate fitness consequences. Just 219 
as there are three forms of capital conveyed in signal content, signal costs are likewise composed 220 
of these same three forms: material capital (e.g., gift-giving displays), embodied capital (e.g., 221 
competitive physical performances), and social capital (e.g., pledges not to associate with out-222 
group members). Importantly, signals often entail costs across multiple capitals simultaneously 223 
(Figure 2).  For example, torch fishing on Ifaluk, which has been analyzed as a costly signal of 224 
male fishers’ matriline investments, entails the material capital costs of the required technology, 225 
including torches, hooks, and nets; the embodied capital costs of time and energy expenditure; 226 
and the social capital costs of forgoing investments in other matrilines22.  227 
 228 
How and when costs can be paid 229 
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 230 
Costs need not be limited to those entailed in the immediate production of the signal. Some costs 231 
may instead be ongoing, periodic, or delayed, and other costs may never be realized49,54. To 232 
emphasize the different ways in which costs may be paid, we distinguish between capital that is 233 
spent, risked, and/or forgone (Figure 2). Capital that is spent can be transferred to others (e.g., 234 
when food is shared, Box 2A) or burned via irretrievable expenditure (e.g., when blankets are 235 
literally burned in a potlatch, or when calories are burned in a performance, Box 2B). Capital can 236 
also be risked, and risked in different ways. Some risks may be entailed in the production of a 237 
signal (e.g., firewalkers risk bodily harm, Box 2C), whereas other risks are delayed and ongoing 238 
(e.g., scars marking group membership exposing their bearer to risk of injury from enemies long 239 
after the original physical toll of scarification55). Finally, capital can also be forgone (i.e. 240 
opportunity costs) when an individual gives up the opportunity to gain from capital that they 241 
have or could secure (e.g., food taboos and religious dietary restrictions). 242 
 243 
While risked and forgone capital are only “potential”, not “realized” (spent), costs—leading 244 
many to dismiss them as beyond the scope of costly signaling9,38,47,48—we suggest that such costs 245 
are in fact compatible with signaling theory46,54 and may often be crucial elements of many 246 
signaling systems. The vast economic literature on risk and uncertainty already demonstrates the 247 
importance of potential costs in shaping behavior. Including such potential costs in our 248 
framework highlights that signal costs may be paid at different times, if at all: for example, while 249 
costs involving spent capital (burnt or transferred) are paid immediately, costs from risked 250 
capital are probabilistic, and costs from forgone opportunities are also dependent on outside 251 
options. 252 
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 253 
Audience independent and dependent costs 254 
 255 
Costs also differ in whether they are paid without the involvement of others (audience 256 
independent) or are socially imposed (audience dependent)36,38,53,56–58. In this regard, spent costs 257 
are paid in the production of the signal and are thus necessarily independent of the audience. 258 
Risked and forgone costs, however, may or may not be shaped by the audience. For example, 259 
risked embodied capital may be audience independent, as when a Tamil villager walks across a 260 
bed of hot coals (Box 2C), or audience dependent, as when a Maring man dances at a kaiko, 261 
publicly committing himself to participate in the next round of inter-tribal warfare59. Forgone 262 
costs can similarly be audience independent, such as fasting as part of a religious vow, or 263 
audience dependent, such as wearing markers of devotion that lead members of the religious out-264 
group to distance themselves.  265 
 266 
Importantly, some audience-dependent costs are paid not by the honest sender, but by the 267 
(revealed) deceptive sender (e.g., reporters who are fired after their stories are revealed to be 268 
unsubstantiated). Such costs may be particularly prevalent and potent in human signaling 269 
systems53,60. For example, many religions require private practices, such as prayer and morning 270 
ablutions, whose primary costs are the social stigma involved in failing to exhibit the practices 271 
when, on the rare occasion, they are expected in a public setting61. The large literature on 272 
monitoring and punishment makes clear the power of audience-dependent costs to drive 273 
behavior62. The scope for audience-dependent costs is large, and including them within the rubric 274 
of signaling theory connects it with the wide literature on cooperation, free-riders, and “cheap 275 
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talk”63.  276 
 277 
Costs can be combined 278 
 279 
Finally, we note that signals can entail costs that are paid in multiple ways. For example, 280 
accompanying the spent material and embodied costs of firewalking (Box 2C), there are 281 
additionally audience-independent risked embodied costs (if a person was to fall and get burned) 282 
as well as audience-dependent risked social costs (the gossip that would follow from such a fall). 283 
This example underscores two points. First, although all audience-dependent costs are potential 284 
costs (risked or opportunity costs), not all potential costs are audience-dependent. Second, costs 285 
can be paid in different capitals (as well as in different resources within each capital), which has 286 
largely been overlooked in studies of signaling. Our inclusion of these diverse forms of cost is 287 
aimed at ensuring that even inconspicuous costs are uncovered and analyzed. 288 
 289 
Signal context 290 
 291 
Returning to the male sedge warbler singing, there is in fact more to his signal than just a single 292 
song. For example, females assess the male’s entire repertoire of songs, his activity in song flight 293 
displays, and also the size of his territory44. That is, signals are embedded within a context that 294 
involves other signals and the socioecological context. This context influences all aspects of 295 
signaling, including the functions the signals serve and the forms the signals take.  296 
 297 
What factors of the socioecological context might moderate human signals? Aspects of the 298 
Content, cost and context in signaling systems  14 
 
environment can shape whether and how a signal is received and the set of signals available to 299 
the sender. These factors can be elements of the physical environment (e.g., background noise, 300 
visibility) and the social environment (e.g., laws or social norms that shape receivers’ baseline 301 
expectation of behavior). Consequently, some of the costs that are entailed in a signal may not be 302 
strategic costs (those that ensure that the signal is effective at promoting a beneficial response in 303 
the receiver) but instead may be efficacy costs (those costs that are necessary to simply ensure 304 
that the signal, regardless of its reliability, is encountered by the receiver)42,64,65. 305 
 306 
Studies of receiver psychology have shown that signals are often comprised of multiple 307 
elements: they may be “multimodal” (involving multiple sensory modalities) or 308 
“multicomponent” (occurring within the same sensory channel)66–70, at least in part to ensure a 309 
signal’s observability, robustness, and memorability64,66,67,71. The multiple elements of the sedge 310 
warbler’s signaling system (including multiple songs and flight displays) are likely to have been 311 
selected for these reasons, as are the pageantry of religious rituals with their elaborate ceremonial 312 
procedures, costumes, chants and songs. Finally, more immediate contextual factors include the 313 
number and identity of receivers (e.g., in-group versus out-group members72) and the proportion 314 
of receivers who are unintended, i.e. “eavesdroppers”37,73. Senders may calibrate signals to avoid 315 
eavesdroppers or to minimize receiver skepticism about the degree to which the signal is 316 
intended for them.  317 
 318 
In sum, contextual factors can both constrain and enhance the potential for signals. For example, 319 
signals can be constrained by high efficacy costs from increased background noise (resulting in 320 
signals that have multiple redundant elements, potentially across multiple channels of 321 
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communication), or facilitated by social norms and institutions that provide space for signaling. 322 
Signals may vary between socioecological settings not only due to different selection pressures 323 
on signal function, but also due to different contextual constraints. For example, male ultra-324 
Orthodox Jews in Israel often remain in yeshivot until after 40 years of age, which results in a 325 
draft deferment and extreme poverty, to signal their commitment to the ultra-Orthodox 326 
community. But in the U.S., without the draft, remaining in yeshivot for such a long time among 327 
ultra-Orthodox Jews rather implies some dysfunction and inability to enter the mainstream 328 
market economy74. Any signal system can only be evaluated in light of its particular context. 329 
 330 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 331 
 332 
Our framework raises several outstanding theoretical and methodological issues, which we now 333 
sketch out here, as they highlight promising avenues for future research.  334 
 335 
Theoretical issues 336 
 337 
Signal cost and content 338 
 339 
Our inclusive view of costs reveals ways in which cost may have a more complex relationship to 340 
content than is often assumed43. It is not always as straightforward as recognizing the 341 
physiological and cognitive effort (spent embodied capital), as is the case for the male sedge 342 
warbler’s song. While spent costs such as these are dependent on the sender’s capital, risked and 343 
forgone costs may not be so tightly constrained. Future modeling work should help clarify the 344 
relationship between the sender’s capital and the types of signal costs borne. For example, it may 345 
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be that senders holding less capital are more likely to take on risked costs, because they do not 346 
have sufficient capital to spend75. Alternatively, senders who hold more capital may be more 347 
willing to take on risked costs because of their greater ability to buffer in case of loss.  348 
 349 
While spent costs may be more tightly linked to the signal content, audience-dependent costs 350 
may often have an arbitrary link to signal content53,56. For example, many religious markers, 351 
such as head coverings or adornments, are not intrinsically linked to their bearer’s character, but 352 
are, however, policed by others. Such arbitrary links could be sustained when signals are at least 353 
partially verifiable: that is, receivers can in the long term evaluate when signals are 354 
dishonest53,63,76. Establishing the conditions under which signal costs should, or should not, be 355 
tightly related to signal content is an important area for further study.  356 
 357 
Who pays the costs? 358 
 359 
While audience-independent costs are inherently borne by all senders, audience-dependent costs 360 
may be more variable. First, audience-dependent costs may be meted out to senders who are 361 
revealed to be deceptive, such as warriors who feign injury to avoid a raid55 or academics who 362 
falsify their curriculum vitae, rather than those who are revealed to be honest9,46,48,49. This means 363 
that it is important to consider not only the cost of displaying an honest signal, but also the cost 364 
of displaying a dishonest one. Second, imposing a cost on a sender can itself be costly, whether 365 
the punisher risks injury or forgoes social opportunities in order to avoid and shun a deceptive 366 
sender. From a theoretical standpoint, this is important because it implies a second-order free-367 
rider problem, especially when there are multiple receivers: which receivers are willing to bear 368 
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the cost of ensuring sender honesty by imposing these audience-dependent costs? Receivers 369 
generally have different incentives to bear these costs: for example, group leaders may stand to 370 
gain a higher net benefit from imposing punishment than do other group members77. Future work 371 
should investigate when costs are expected to be borne by the honest or dishonest sender, and 372 
whether the receiver bears any costs as well.  373 
 374 
Context and signal evolution 375 
 376 
An additional theoretical issue is the feedback between socioecological context—both the social 377 
and physical environment—and signaling systems. First, the context may influence the set of 378 
signals that are available for members of the population to use, as with the ultra-Orthodox Jewish 379 
men in Israel versus the U.S. in the example described above74. All social environments may 380 
have, at least theoretically, a multitude of potential signaling solutions to particular local 381 
problems, yet only a few may actually be observed43,53. How researchers can make predictions 382 
about which signaling solution(s) to a given dilemma may arise in a given environment remains 383 
unexplored. Second, signals themselves may affect the socioecological context as they are 384 
transformed from voluntary to compulsory acts. Future work will need to develop a plausible 385 
theory for how signals become institutionalized in this way.  386 
 387 
Methodological issues 388 
 389 
We recognize that the task of operationalizing the categories in our framework is not without 390 
challenges, as definitively establishing the relevant elements of signal context, content, and cost 391 
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can be difficult empirically. Here, we identify some of the likely hurdles and suggest some 392 
potential methodological tools to overcome them. 393 
 394 
Context 395 
 396 
Identifying and understanding content and cost requires a full characterization of the context in 397 
which putative signaling is occurring. It is clear that local context is essential for uncovering the 398 
function and meaning of signaling behaviors. Not only does a characterization of local context 399 
help researchers identify the fitness-relevant problems driving signal evolution, but local context 400 
further shapes the particular form that the evolved signals may take. On Ifaluk, for example, the 401 
local norms that constrain canoe ownership to matrilines enable torch fishing to indicate 402 
matriline strength (social capital), but in communities with different canoe ownership norms, 403 
torch fishing may be unrelated to matriline strength22, and any signal of social capital would 404 
necessarily take a different form. Ethnographic fieldwork, still the central methodological tool 405 
for all anthropologists studying extant cultures, can provide the essential details of local context. 406 
The anthropological staple of cross-cultural comparison may be one way to identify which 407 
features of the local context are most relevant to shaping signal content and cost.  408 
 409 
Content 410 
 411 
We have tried to broaden our conception of the content of any signal, particularly emphasizing 412 
its multiplicity. This does not imply an infinite set of possibilities for signal content. Often, 413 
anthropologists drawing on signaling theory have remained somewhat agnostic about signal 414 
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content, assuming that it may be conveying multiple meanings (e.g., commitment to the group, 415 
strength, and hunting ability). We agree with such multiplicity, but call for a more active attempt 416 
to delineate these potential meanings and their attendant influences on receivers. Practically, this 417 
could be achieved by assessing the relationship between the actions and traits of potential 418 
senders and receivers’ perceptions and responses to them. This can be done through such 419 
techniques as reputational sorting tasks and observational studies of behavior, and ideally would 420 
involve measurement of many potential traits, actions, and reputational assessments in order to 421 
pinpoint the actual signal content78,79. Broadly, researchers should aim to identify the payoffs of 422 
signaling for both the sender and receiver under a range of receiver responses, in order to 423 
ultimately identify signal function. 424 
 425 
Costs 426 
 427 
In our framework, we describe a wide range of costs that can help ensure signal honesty. While 428 
we may be able to distinguish them readily in the abstract, the process of cataloguing and 429 
measuring them empirically may not always be straightforward. First, the presence of costs does 430 
not mean that they are implicated in maintaining honesty: as discussed above, they may be 431 
efficacy costs, which may be empirically hard to distinguish from strategic costs, as they may be 432 
paid simultaneously and inseparably49. A careful attention to context in observational studies 433 
should help in the task of distinguishing the two, as could experimental or vignette manipulations 434 
of context. Second, the equality of costs across individuals need not imply that signaling is 435 
dishonest: it could be that individuals gain differential benefit. This means that benefits to the 436 
sender—and eventually the overall cost-benefit ratio—should be assessed empirically. This 437 
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could entail observing senders before and after signaling events, for example measuring 438 
reputational change27. Third, the absence of cost is also an empirical challenge: when costs are 439 
meted out to deceptive signalers, the costs may be empirically invisible when most or all 440 
signalers are honest. Given the rarity of observing such punishment, vignettes may offer a 441 
promising technique to determine what receivers’ likely response would be to such infractions by 442 
a sender48,80. The economic approach of choice modeling may also be useful in quantifying 443 
opportunity costs.   444 
 445 
Even for those costs which are spent (e.g., handicaps) and are easily recognized, such as the 446 
fulfillment of religious vows (see Box 2C), the fundamental task of empirically measuring them 447 
can be challenging9. Simply getting an average measure of cost (and benefit) across individuals 448 
can entail sizable amounts of work, and getting individual measures may be prohibitive. Another 449 
issue is that potential variation differs across forms of capital: material capital, for example, 450 
seems to have a much wider inter-individual range than social or embodied capital, cross-451 
culturally51. Furthermore, some forms of capital may be more difficult to quantify than others 452 
(e.g., it is easier to quantify spent money or calories than it is to measure spent social capital). 453 
This makes the task of establishing the commensurability of costs across different forms of 454 
capital yet more challenging55,81. How are we to establish the “exchange value” of costs that 455 
bridge different forms of capital? And how do we evaluate the relative costs and benefits across 456 
all these currencies for different actors? Individuals vary in their ability and willingness to 457 
exchange across currencies (taking on a cost in one capital in order to build another) based on the 458 
capital(s) they have and need. Ethnographic insight will of course be crucial in this endeavor, as 459 
it can provide an appreciation of the relative importance of each form of capital to individual 460 
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livelihood51. Choice modeling may again also be of use, though here in particular we expect that 461 
different individuals may have different revealed preferences.  462 
 463 
CONCLUSIONS 464 
 465 
The handicap principle3,4 is a compelling idea and its application to explain extravagant behavior 466 
in humans and other animals has been influential9. Certainly, it compelled a number of us to 467 
pursue research aimed at testing some of its predictions. In the course of applying it—both in 468 
ethnographic fieldwork settings and in experimental game settings—we have each recognized 469 
the need for signaling theory to be extended. It is telling that much of the work extending 470 
signaling theory in the animal communication literature has been prompted by empirical 471 
research. We feel that the anthropological investigations of signals have similar potential to 472 
advance signaling theory. Here, we have tried to synthesize this work to create a framework that 473 
can demonstrate the full breadth and complexity of signaling systems. We hope this framework 474 
will stimulate further discussion and development of signaling theory of both human and non-475 
human signaling systems.  476 
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BOXES AND FIGURES 477 
 478 
Box 1: Evolution of reliable communication 479 
 480 
Receivers are constantly attending to the many inputs around them that provide information 481 
about the environment. Many of these inputs are cues: acts or structures that reliably inform the 482 
receiver about some feature of the world to which they benefit from responding. For example, 483 
the whine of a mosquito is a cue that prompts a quick swat. In contrast to signals, cues have not 484 
been selected for the purpose of altering receiver behavior47. However, if the sender benefits, 485 
cues can evolve into signals, making the boundary between signals and cues sometimes fuzzy82. 486 
 487 
What then prevents the sender from using signals to exploit a receiver? As many have noted, 488 
there are multiple ways in which reliable communication can be maintained by selection beyond 489 
the handicap principle and its easily observable production costs9,10,13,46,49,80,83.  490 
 491 
Relationship between sender and receiver 492 
Alignment of interests: when sender and receiver interests are aligned, there is no incentive for 493 
dishonesty and thus no need for an honesty enforcing mechanism. This results in low-cost 494 
“conventional” signals56 that can be used to coordinate actions (e.g., similar jerseys on a sports 495 
team).  496 
Repeated interactions: honesty can be maintained without high cost when senders and receivers 497 
interact repeatedly because receivers can call the sender’s bluff84.  498 
 499 
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Differential benefits 500 
Honesty can be maintained by differential benefits, rather than differential costs85. For example, 501 
a need can be honestly signaled when those most lacking benefit more, such as when chicks beg 502 
for food86.  503 
 504 
Intrinsic properties of the display 505 
Indices: reliability may be assured when the signal is intrinsically correlated with the sender’s 506 
quality and is thus inherently “unfakeable” (e.g., the pitch of a red deer’s roar is an index of his 507 
size)47,65,87,46,88. There is some debate among biologists concerning the boundary between indices 508 
and costly signals89, but it is generally thought that since indices are physiologically constrained, 509 
they do not require additional costs to be reliable. 510 
 511 
Box 2: Signaling case studies 512 
 513 
Here we explore three well known examples to which signaling theory has been applied, and 514 
illustrate how our framework could allow them to be interpreted in a new light. We briefly 515 
describe these settings in order to give concrete examples of the complexity of signaling systems, 516 
and how our framework can be applied to make sense of such complexity. 517 
 518 
A: Hadza foraging 519 
 520 
Among the Hadza, a group of mobile hunter-gatherers living in northern Tanzania90,91, there is a 521 
strong sexual division of labor in which women pursue relatively reliable resources (e.g., tubers, 522 
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berries, and baobab pods) and men pursue higher variance resources, particularly meat and 523 
honey. Hawkes and colleagues92 have suggested that men’s consistent pursuit of these risky 524 
resources (especially large game) is more readily explained as their attempts to “show off” and 525 
gain status, rather than as their effort to provision their families. Male hunting has therefore been 526 
framed as a costly signal of the hunter’s quality, with only truly skilled hunters able to regularly 527 
capture large game and share it with others14. This interpretation of men’s hunting has been 528 
critiqued93–95, including recent concerns that hunting is too noisy to serve as an honest signal of 529 
quality79. Wood and Marlowe96, for example, demonstrate that men are actually more able to 530 
provision their own family than suggested, arguing that men’s hunting can therefore be 531 
understood primarily as effort directed toward provisioning, with the additional burden of 532 
tolerated scrounging leading to the observed pattern of food distribution. In this light, some 533 
men’s foraging and provisioning may be a cue rather than a signal47, insofar as men may benefit 534 
from inclusive fitness and reciprocity, rather than from communication alone. 535 
 536 
Whether a cue or signal, observers benefit by attending and responding to the foragers’ behavior, 537 
and foragers may be motivated by both the provisioning and the communicative potential 538 
entailed in the pursuit of large game. Regardless, the view that we promote with our framework 539 
suggests that single signals such as the pursuit of large game should not be studied in isolation, 540 
but rather in their broader context.  541 
 542 
Broadening our focus in this way reveals the communicative potential inherent in other Hadza 543 
foraging activities. Hadza men and women forage for a wide range of resources, notably 544 
including honey and small game. When men collect honey, a highly desired resource, they often 545 
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exert more effort to try to direct it to their kin and other desired partners. The collector’s ability 546 
to direct the foraged goods to particular partners, including kin and others, could convey to the 547 
recipients the collector’s continued commitment to their partnership. When women forage 548 
collectively for tubers, their returns are dictated largely by the amount of time and effort 549 
invested, so even an effort primarily seen as provisioning kin may additionally hold signal 550 
content of the skill and dedication of the forager, as well as her potential value as a foraging 551 
partner. In accordance with this, Hadza women who are known as the best tuber diggers are 552 
preferred as campmates, and while men known as good hunters are more often named as friends, 553 
it is those who are known as the best honey collectors who are yet more often named as “best 554 
friends”90. As our framework aims to make clear, it need not only be conspicuous and seemingly 555 
costly acts that have signal value.  556 
 557 
B: Tlingit potlatch 558 
 559 
“So much has been written about the potlatch of the Northwest Coast tribes that almost everyone 560 
has some ideas about it”97—indeed, the potlatch is not only an iconic cultural practice 561 
extensively discussed by anthropologists, but it is also the archetypical anthropological example 562 
of costly signaling in the biological literature. While the best-known feature of the potlatch is the 563 
hosts’ extravagant spending of material capital, potlatch systems entail multiple signals and 564 
responses. 565 
  566 
Although there is some variation in potlatches among the different groups who practice(d) it, the 567 
core concept is the same: it is a ritual festival held in order to repay a favor given to the potlatch 568 
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hosts by the guests. As a more specific case study, we focus on the Tlingit people from Southeast 569 
Alaska, where a common occasion for potlatches was to pay back help given after someone had 570 
died. Tlingit society is divided into two matrilineal moieties (descent groups), each of which 571 
comprises a number of kin-based clans, which in turn may be geographically distributed across 572 
many communities. Maintenance of balance between the moieties is strongly emphasized: for 573 
example, marriages must occur between moieties, and major help (such as in building a house) 574 
can only be given by members of the opposite moiety. After a death, the funeral is held by the 575 
opposite moiety (patrilineal kin of the deceased), and the potlatch given after around forty days 576 
by the matrilineal kin marks the end of the mourning period and the repayment of the debt they 577 
incurred to the opposite moiety98. 578 
  579 
What signals are given during a potlatch? The most conspicuous are the enormous quantities of 580 
food and gifts given by the hosts to the guests (transferred material capital) and the hosts’ 581 
destruction of their own property, including sacrificing slaves as well as destroying valuable 582 
copper plates (burnt material capital – in some cases literally). These acts are widely interpreted 583 
as hosts signaling their status (social capital) to the guests97–99. However, there are likely multiple 584 
audiences at play, with rival hosts signaling to each other as well as to the guests. The sender’s 585 
message may be his own status as an individual, but also the status of his clan, communicated in 586 
terms of his lineage validating its ownership over sacred clan objects, such as crests99. That is, 587 
such signals may be multiplex. 588 
  589 
While these dramatic signals of spent capital are the main event of the potlatch98, they are by no 590 
means the only event. The ceremony traditionally began with a mock battle, where the hosts 591 
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symbolically submitted to the guests’ staged attack. The potlatch continued with multiple stages 592 
of singing, dancing and oratory, which Kan98 views as a form of exchange between hosts and 593 
guests. These included songs of condolence, whose additional meaning was to confirm the 594 
singer’s lineage and its claims to the clan’s crests; love songs, which carried a meaning of 595 
appeasement between potential rivals; and riddles, where rival would attempt to outwit each 596 
other98,99. Here, the hosts are not the only signal senders: the guests also signal to the hosts, and 597 
rival groups of guests signal to each other, creating an arena in which valuable social information 598 
about relative status is exchanged and evaluated. 599 
  600 
The potlatch offers two additional points of interest from a signaling perspective. First, the 601 
signals have likely been affected by changes in socioeconomic context, namely the arrival of 602 
white settlers. Ringel100 suggests that the concomitant increase in material wealth and decrease in 603 
other means to gain social status (e.g. due to banning of warfare) shifted the function of Kwakiutl 604 
potlatches from signaling group membership to signaling personal status. Second, while some 605 
authors see the potlatch simply as an expression of status, others suggest that in fact it functions 606 
to raise status97. Boone2 argues that the latter is not a true signal, as a signal should inform the 607 
receiver of the attribute being signaled, but not change that attribute. How signals may evolve 608 
into behaviors that do function to affect the attribute being signaled is a promising avenue for 609 
future research. 610 
 611 
C: South Indian religious displays 612 
 613 
In Tamil Nadu, South India, people carefully observe the religious actions of their peers. They do 614 
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so in part because of beliefs about how a person’s actions reflect her nature and character.  615 
 616 
A person’s religious adherence is often clearly marked in South India, as elsewhere. After 617 
worshipping at home or at a temple, Hindus mark their foreheads with powder or ash, with 618 
particular markings (tilaka) associated with specific deities and sects. Hindu women place a 619 
small dot (poṭṭu, bindi) on their forehead as a sign of modesty, and Christian women are 620 
consequently identifiable by their bare foreheads. When devotees are preparing to perform a 621 
religious act, they will often wear clothes of a particular color, with that color being associated 622 
with a particular deity (red or yellow for the goddess, black for Ayyappan, light blue or khaki for 623 
Jesus, etc.). The acts of devotion that individuals carry out are their most conspicuous 624 
demonstrations of faith. Many Christians attend Sunday services, while Hindus visit temples 625 
each week to take darshan, the auspicious mutual viewing of the deity, and participate in 626 
monthly pujas. Festivals are opportunities for further enactments of faith. Often, devotees fulfill 627 
vows made in gratitude for divine assistance (help conceiving a child, getting a job, overcoming 628 
an illness, etc.). These acts of vow fulfillment (nērttikkaṭaṉ) can take many different forms, at 629 
the discretion of the fulfiller: making a simple offering to the deity, going on pilgrimage to the 630 
deity’s church or temple, walking across a bed of hot coals, sacrificing a goat, or piercing one’s 631 
body with hooks or spears. Some Hindus also become possessed, their eyes bulging and arms 632 
flailing. Often, the fulfillment of religious vows entails a period of fasting (viratam), during 633 
which time devotees follow a variety of requirements and prohibitions. They are limited to one 634 
meal a day, are barred from drinking alcohol or smoking, must bathe daily, are prohibited from 635 
fighting with others, cannot eat particular foods, must abstain from sex, have to avoid the houses 636 
of pregnant and menstruating women, can only eat at homes where others are fasting, etc.  637 
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 638 
These various displays of religious devotion are not only seen as evidence of a person’s 639 
devotion; much more is inferred about a person from the sum total of her religious displays 640 
(Figure 1). Villagers appear to be using these displays to discern something about the capital and 641 
character of the individual27. For example, they are more likely to see those performing all 642 
religious acts as more devout (character), those who perform physically demanding acts as strong 643 
(embodied capital), and those who attend regular worship and undertake public ritual acts as 644 
generous and of good character (social capital). Consequently, villagers are more likely to turn to 645 
such individuals when they are in need of support, ultimately conferring benefits to both senders 646 
and receivers, as they are more likely to have enduring, reciprocal relationships29. 647 
 648 
There are multiple ways in which these religious displays are kept reliable (Figure 2). Possession 649 
may be such a convincing demonstration of devotion because it is physiologically and 650 
emotionally hard to fake. The dramatic acts of vow fulfillment are often monetarily costly (burnt 651 
material capital), entail immediate strain and stress (burnt embodied capital), and risk serious 652 
bodily harm (audience-independent risked embodied capital). Consistently attending weekly and 653 
monthly services involves the cumulative commitment of many hours that could otherwise have 654 
been used for other ends (audience-independent forgone capital). The prohibitions associated 655 
with fasting entail serious opportunity costs, whether in terms of forgone calories (audience-656 
independent forgone capital) or forgone socializing (audience-dependent forgone capital). While 657 
some religious displays such as the various bodily adornments that mark a person as a devotee 658 
are certainly materially cheap, the diligent policing of those markers by others mean that those 659 
who are found to be faking can face serious punishment in the form of social ostracism 660 
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(audience-dependent risked capital). Any one individual will be performing multiple types of 661 
religious displays, across multiple modalities and entailing multiple types of costs across 662 
multiple forms of capital. Although these varied potential costs have been recognized, their 663 
commensurability remains an open question. Further research should also identify how the 664 
differential costs associated with these signaling acts shape individuals’ ability to undertake 665 
them.   666 
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Figure 1. Signal content 667 
 668 
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 669 
 670 
Figure 1. The content of a signal -- including the message sent by the sender as well as the 671 
meaning inferred by a receiver -- comprises information about the sender’s capital (embodied, 672 
material and/or social capital) and/or the sender’s character (values and commitments). Three 673 
case studies (Box 2) illustrate how a single signal may have manifold content of any single 674 
signal. It is important to note that these are postulated examples of signal content, and all 675 
categories of signal content need not be simultaneously present.  676 
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Figure 2. Signal cost 677 
       678 
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 680 
Figure 2. Signal costs may be paid in three forms of capital (embodied, material and/or social). 681 
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Costs may be paid by forgoing opportunities to acquire more capital; otherwise, costs are paid by 682 
risking or spending capital already held. Capital that is spent may be used up in the signal (burnt) 683 
or transferred to the receiver. Case studies from Box 2 illustrate how any given signal can 684 
include multiple costs paid in different ways. These are postulated examples of signal cost, and 685 
all categories of signal cost need not be simultaneously present.  686 
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